A recent social media comment raised thoughtful concerns about The Online Citizen’s (TOC) reporting on the Yang Kee Logistics affair.
The commenter urged caution, noting that “a company of this size does not go from viable concern into a forced sale” without breaches or distress—and questioned the lack of alternative financing or legal advice.
Let’s unpack these points, and include UOB’s official response for balance.
Was Yang Kee in serious trouble before the forced sale?
Not initially. According to Ken Koh’s statutory declaration (SD), Yang Kee had approximately $66 million in cash and cash equivalents, and property assets valued at around S$560 million, a figure supported by internal documents and later validated when Logos resold the same properties in 2024 for a significant gain.
The financial distress came after the default letter—not before.
Koh states that following the letter, UOB allegedly warned customers and suppliers not to do business with Yang Kee, leading to operational sabotage, loss of business, and cash flow problems. This triggered a burn rate that the group struggled to contain.
From the issuance of the default letter to the eventual proposal from Guangdong Provincial Port & Shipping Group (GDPS)—a Chinese state-owned enterprise exploring a strategic investment in Yang Kee Logistics—about 16 months had passed.
Koh also shared with TOC that UOB had never issued any formal written demand for repayment prior to the default letter. The letter cited the expiration of certain facilities, which UOB used to trigger the default.
The Cross-Default Trigger That Brought Down the House
At the heart of Yang Kee’s collapse was a clause buried in its financing agreements—a cross-default clause, which is clearly outlined in the bond documentation.
This clause states that if any of the group’s debts become capable of being declared due and payable, all debts—including mortgages with DBS and CIMB—could be recalled.
When UOB issued its default letter based on the expiry of certain facilities (not due to missed repayments), this triggered the clause—automatically classifying Yang Kee as being in default across all its banking relationships, exactly as described in Ken Koh’s statutory declaration.
This meant that even though the group still had $66 million in cash reserves at the time, it became untouchable to external investors.
In effect, UOB didn’t just pull its own support—it detonated a financial tripwire that forced other lenders to act, regardless of their own risk appetite. That made refinancing or capital injection impossible, even though GDPS and Temasek were actively preparing proposals.
No investor can pass due diligence when a company is in cross-default status. That one move shifted Yang Kee from a business navigating commercial challenges into a full-blown financial crisis—not because it had run out of money, but because the financing framework collapsed around it.
UOB Didn’t Have to Pull the Trigger—But It Did
As noted in Koh’s statutory declaration, UOB was not legally required to issue the default letter when it did. There was no payment default—only the expiry of facilities—and no urgent external pressure to enforce repayment.
Yet the bank chose to act, fully aware of the consequences: once a default is on record, refinancing dies. That decision effectively blocked all ongoing rescue efforts from GDPS and Temasek.
This wasn’t just enforcement. It was a pre-emptive strike—one that collapsed the entire refinancing bridge before it could be built.
At that point, Yang Kee was already resisting UOB’s push to sell assets to Logos and Geodis.
Six months later, Koh discovered that UOB was advising ESR in its acquisition of Logos, whose Singapore portfolio would include Yang Kee’s properties—raising serious conflict of interest concerns.
Did Yang Kee seek alternative financing or legal advice?
Yes—on financing. Documents show DBS acted in an advisory role, and investment offers were made from Temasek and GDPS to refinance UOB.
However, in his clarification to TOC, Koh admitted he did not seek legal advice regarding the alleged banking secrecy breaches or intimidation, citing fears of UOB’s threats to bankrupt both him and his father.
Instead, he focused on refinancing UOB out—not expecting that a default letter could be used to derail the process entirely.
Once the letter was issued, all refinancing activity ground to a halt. No investor or lender could move forward, as due diligence would fail under insolvency risk.
By the time GDPS submitted its offer, Yang Kee was under significant distress. The 2022 proposal involved refinancing S$258 million in senior secured debt.
Koh noted that these loans were backed by property assets valued at S$560 million—a figure later supported when Logos sold the properties in 2024 for a gain of S$104 million.
So why is UOB being scrutinized?
The concern is not whether UOB had the legal right to act after default—but whether its conduct leading up to that point was ethical, proportionate, and in good faith. Koh alleges the following:
- Breach of banking secrecy laws
- Criminal intimidation to prevent him from reporting to authorities
- Pressuring him to accept Logos’ offer, while UOB was also advising ESR (Logos’ acquirer)
- Refusing to engage Temasek and GDPS, despite active refinancing proposals
After the default letter:
- UOB allegedly pressured him to sell Yang Kee’s properties for $1
- UOB sabotaged customer/supplier relationships, worsening financial conditions
- Receivers were appointed by bondholders, allegedly under pressure from UOB
- The GDPS offer—which included refinancing, operational continuity, and capital injection—was rejected
- Yang Kee’s management was excluded from final negotiations
These are serious allegations—but they are not the same as claiming Yang Kee wasn’t in trouble. Koh’s position is that UOB’s actions caused the trouble by deliberately setting off mechanisms that blocked recovery options.
UOB’s Official Response
When contacted by The Online Citizen, a UOB spokesperson provided the following statement:
“Upon receiving the complaint, we reached out to Mr Ken Koh on several occasions to provide us with materials to support his allegations. However, he has so far declined to do so. The sale of Yang Kee Group’s assets was conducted professionally by the appointed Receivers of the holding company in accordance with due legal process. After a thorough internal investigation, we have found that the five allegations mentioned are baseless and rejected by the Bank.”
TOC acknowledges UOB’s response and has included it here in full.
What’s Next?
The Online Citizen is committed to transparency and public accountability. We are opening up the documents and correspondence available to us for public scrutiny, so readers can assess the facts and form their own conclusions.
This includes term sheets, mandate letters, internal emails, and investment proposals.
We do not claim Yang Kee Logistics was financially sound. Nor do we deny UOB’s legal right to enforce its loans.
But when conflicting narratives emerge—and immense corporate power is exercised without transparency—public scrutiny becomes essential.
If additional documents surface or stakeholders come forward, we will publish those, too.
UOB is welcome to provide further clarifications or documentation to support its position, which we will publish in full, as we have done with its official statement.
This is not about taking sides. It’s about making sure Singapore’s business environment upholds integrity, fairness, and public trust.
The post Yang Kee Logistics: The question isn’t if Yang Kee struggled—It’s what UOB did next appeared first on The Online Citizen.
