The People’s Action Party (PAP) claimed a stronger mandate in Singapore’s General Election 2025, winning 65.57% of the national vote and 87 parliamentary seats.
This marked a clear numerical improvement over its 2020 performance of 61.24% and gave Prime Minister Lawrence Wong his first electoral victory as the party’s secretary-general.
While the ruling party celebrated the outcome as a “clear and strong mandate”, a different picture can be drawn—one not of genuine voter enthusiasm, as suggested by turnout at opposition rallies, but of a deeply engineered electoral environment.
A combination of systemic electoral restructuring, targeted financial reliefs, symbolic estate upgrades, and fear-based messaging reinforced a well-worn pattern: the consolidation of political dominance under the guise of democratic legitimacy.
Gerrymandering and electoral advantage: A cartography of control
A hallmark of Singapore’s electoral system, gerrymandering once again played a central role in GE2025.
The Electoral Boundaries Review Committee released its report less than two months before polling day—leaving little time and almost no recourse for opposition parties to recalibrate their ground operations.
New group representation constituencies (GRCs), such as Marine Parade–Braddell Heights, were redrawn with awkward and peculiar borders.
These newly created areas merged dissimilar neighbourhoods into unfamiliar blocs—leading the Workers’ Party to drop Marine Parade–Braddell Heights GRC, much to the disappointment of many residents who had hoped for continued opposition presence.
On The Online Citizen’s six-hour election night livestream, panellists described the redistricting as “strategic vote dilution,” aimed at neutralising growing opposition clusters while strengthening PAP strongholds.
One example was West Coast–Jurong West GRC, which was redrawn to include new segments after the Progress Singapore Party narrowly lost the original West Coast GRC in 2020 with 48.32% of the vote, but saw its share drop to 39.99% in GE2025.
The boundaries of West Coast GRC were significantly altered ahead of the election. About 41,000 voters from Jurong GRC (25.8% of the total GRC’s electorate) —mainly from Jurong Spring and Taman Jurong—were added to form the newly renamed West Coast–Jurong West GRC.
At the same time, areas such as HarbourFront and Sentosa were shifted to Radin Mas SMC, while Dover and Telok Blangah were moved to Tanjong Pagar GRC.
This redrawing affected not only the opposition’s chances but also the public perception of electoral competitiveness.
By breaking up historically engaged communities, it disrupted political continuity and weakened the local identity of constituencies.
For the average voter, such complexity bred disengagement and confusion.
Subsidies, S$1 deals, and the politics of short-term relief
Among the more visible aspects of GE2025 was the PAP’s rollout of heavily subsidised “S$1 deals”, including cheap hawker meals, eggs, public transport rebates, and basic health check-ups.
These were widely publicised through grassroots channels and town council communications, with ruling party members often acting as the public faces of these schemes. While positioned as efforts to ease cost-of-living burdens, their timing of the handouts aligned conspicuously with the election campaign.
Speaking on the stream, SDP chairman Dr Paul Tambyah, who again lost in Bukit Panjang SMC to PAP’s Liang Eng Hwa by a wider margin than in 2020, attributed the party’s reduced vote share in part to the timing and appeal of the S$1 relief schemes.
He noted that many voters expressed genuine gratitude for the offers, with some explicitly saying they supported the opposition but felt compelled to vote for the PAP due to immediate financial needs.
“In the last couple of days of house visits,” he said, “I kept hearing the same refrain: ‘We like you. We think Singapore needs to change. But frankly, I need that $1 deal.’”
He added, “We’ve seen incidents—like the one at the community club—where people were literally fighting each other to access the vouchers for the $1 deal. So, there is real need out there. And to many voters, the PAP appears to be the party with the resources to meet that need.”
This dependency isn’t new, but its packaging in GE2025 was particularly refined. The PAP avoided aggressive rhetoric and instead presented itself as the only credible custodian of stability—reinforcing the psychology of risk aversion.
By offering immediate, tangible relief while framing alternatives as risky or uncertain, the party constructed a false binary: continuity with perks, or disruption with loss.
Bundled town council materials and the erosion of state-party boundaries
An incident in Chua Chu Kang GRC illustrated how state resources and political campaigning frequently blur during elections.
On 25 April, a resident received a plastic-wrapped package containing both a PAP campaign flyer and a Chua Chu Kang Town Council publication.
The materials were delivered by a man dressed in clothing resembling People’s Association attire, raising questions about whether official channels were being used for partisan messaging.
The Town Council booklet, presumed to be publicly funded, detailed estate upgrades. Its bundling with political literature suggested that such upgrades might be contingent on voting for the PAP.
Another package, delivered on Nomination Day, included both a town council newsletter and a flyer from the Grassroots Advisor promoting S$1 community deals.
This merging of public messaging with campaign content creates the impression that public services are rewards for political loyalty—particularly problematic in opposition-held areas that have long reported delays or exclusion from such upgrades.
Many residents, especially in contested or opposition-held constituencies, have long believed that town upgrading and municipal improvements are withheld or delayed if their area does not vote for the PAP.
This perception—fostered by years of selective rollouts and public statements linking estate improvements to electoral support—functions as a form of soft coercion, reinforcing the idea that access to state resources is conditional on political alignment.
Fear-based messaging and the spectre of global uncertainty
Throughout GE2025, Lawrence Wong and his team emphasised a narrative of stability amid global turbulence.
From rising inflation and regional insecurity to the return of Donald Trump as U.S. President and his imposition of new trade tariffs, the world was painted as increasingly volatile—and Singapore too small to afford internal political upheaval.
Opposition figures accused the PAP of weaponising fear. Rather than addressing domestic issues—such as housing unaffordability, ministerial accountability, or stagnant wages—the campaign reframed GE2025 as a referendum on national survival.
There was no direct engagement with recent government failings, including controversies around ministerial salaries, alleged conflicts of interest, or lack of transparency in procurement and appointments.
Instead, the PAP maintained a cautious, tightly managed campaign, shielding potentially controversial candidates and elevating Mr Wong’s image as a stable leader. The result: a low-risk campaign that avoided meaningful debate while capitalising on voter anxiety.
The role of traditional media also came under renewed scrutiny during GE2025, particularly in light of the S$900 million subsidy package granted to SPH Media Trust in 2022.
The financial support—framed as necessary to sustain quality journalism—appeared to yield tangible political dividends for the PAP, which benefited from overwhelmingly favourable coverage in both English and vernacular newspapers.
Throughout the campaign period, SPH titles echoed PAP talking points with minimal interrogation, providing wide and uncritical coverage of ministerial remarks, party promises, and symbolic gestures.
In contrast, opposition statements were either downplayed, questioned, or buried deeper within coverage. This disparity gave the ruling party a clear advantage in message amplification, particularly among older and less digitally connected voters—an audience that online media, with its limited reach and resources, struggles to penetrate.
A viral photo taken on 30 April showed a large pile of SPH newspapers being distributed freely at public locations, with prominently positive headlines highlighting PAP figures and their messaging.
For many observers, this exemplified how state-backed media was mobilised to ensure dominant narrative control—one that was neither neutral nor equally representative of all political voices.
Social media postings and digital disinformation
Leaked Telegram messages from the candidates of Jalan Kayu SMC, WP candidate Andre Low, and a viral Instagram post involving PAP’s candidate, former NTUC Secretary-General Ng Chee Meng became lightning rods in the online space.
Low apologised for the vulgar messages, while the latter described an incident in which a trainee alleged passive-aggressive treatment by a former minister during a seminar—identified by netizens as Ng, who they claimed was indeed present, based on their own participation.
Ng has not publicly addressed the allegations that are supposedly about his conduct.
More concerning was the proliferation of anonymous social media pages and inauthentic accounts that launched sustained personal attacks against opposition figures.
These ranged from defamatory memes to manipulated videos and unverifiable accusations, often timed to coincide with opposition rallies or candidate walkabouts.
According to a report by Channel NewsAsia, there were “clear signs” that bot networks had been mobilised during GE2025.
Yet, while evidence of digital inauthenticity continues to mount, these bots appeared to operate overwhelmingly in one direction—targeting opposition candidates and amplifying pro-PAP content.
While isolated instances of bot-led attacks against ruling party figures were listed, much of the criticism directed at the PAP originated from genuine accounts and reflected verifiable grievances.
In contrast, the attacks against opposition candidates were largely based on fabricated or misleading claims, often lacking attribution or factual grounding.
Campaigning during a long weekend: Voter turnout and timing
The scheduling of GE2025 on 3 May, which fell on a long weekend, raised concerns about lower turnout due to travel plans and reduced voter availability.
Many Singaporeans had made prior travel plans or were away on holiday, reducing the likelihood of voting—especially among younger and overseas voters, groups that tend to support the opposition.
With limited provisions for overseas voting and no postal voting options, participation was again skewed in favour of the domestic, older base.
Déjà vu of GE2015: Opposition setbacks and NCMP near-misses
As results trickled in on election night, many were reminded of GE2015, when opposition representation was reduced to just Aljunied GRC and Hougang SMC.
In GE2025, the Workers’ Party retained its three elected constituencies—Aljunied GRC, Sengkang GRC, and Hougang SMC—securing a total of 10 seats, and also obtained two NCMP seats through narrow losses in Tampines GRC and Jalan Kayu SMC.
But elsewhere, opposition parties struggled.
The Progress Singapore Party lost both of its NCMPs and was shut out of Parliament. The Singapore Democratic Party, despite a vigorous ground campaign, also failed to break through.
Dr Chee Soon Juan, who contested Sembawang West SMC, lost narrowly—earning 46.81% of the vote, just below the Workers’ Party’s 47.37% in Tampines GRC. That small margin cost him the final NCMP seat.
It was a deeply disheartening result for supporters of Dr Chee, a figure who has spent over three decades challenging PAP dominance.
His near-miss symbolises how the system remains calibrated to exclude opposition voices—not due to lack of support, but due to structural thresholds deliberately designed to contain them.
A total of four parties — Singapore United Party (SUP), People’s Power Party (PPP), People’s Alliance for Reform (PAR), and the National Solidarity Party (NSP) — lost their deposits in GE2025, with a combined loss of S$364,500, based on the number of candidates and constituencies contested.
In Tampines GRC, the NSP polled just 0.18% and the PPP 0.4% in a four-cornered fight with the WP and PAP. This is despite the NSP having contested Tampines GRC since 2011. The disastrous results for the smaller parties have led to calls for them to reconsider their future in politics.
Although the Singapore People’s Party did not lose its candidates’ deposits in the contests at Bishan-Toa Payoh GRC and Potong Pasir SMC, its Secretary-General Steve Chia said the party would be reflecting on the outcome and considering its next steps — including whether to merge with other opposition parties or to deregister the SPP altogether.
Conclusion: A mandate manufactured by structure, not consent
While the PAP may claim a “renewed mandate,” GE2025’s outcome must be understood in light of the structural advantages that shaped it. From redrawn boundaries and election-time subsidies to blurred lines between governance and party campaigning, the political playing field remains heavily tilted.
Voters may have chosen continuity, but that does not equate to unconditional approval—nor does it offer a blank cheque for unchecked governance.
What the results do suggest, however, is that, on top of the controversies over the past years, repeated personal attacks on opposition candidates, digital disinformation, planned disruptions against opposition outreach, and politically charged antics during the election campaign period have not significantly dented public support for the PAP.
This electoral resilience may, in fact, reinforce the perception within the ruling party that such tactics are both effective and acceptable.
“Fixing the opposition”—a phrase once used by former Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong—appears poised to remain part of the PAP’s standard operating procedure, not merely as a campaign feature but as a sustained strategy of political containment.
The real question confronting Singaporeans now is whether this so-called strong mandate entitles the PAP government to further consolidate its hold—potentially through more restrictive laws, diminished political plurality, and a heightened reliance on state handouts as a substitute for structural reform and genuine accountability.
Despite decades of promises—such as lifting Singapore to “Swiss standards of living”—many citizens today find themselves struggling with stagnant wages, rising costs, and an increasing dependence on conditional support schemes like the S$1 deals.
If this mandate is used to expand control rather than broaden participation, to pacify through giveaways rather than empower through reform, then the democratic cost may be far greater than the electoral margin suggests.
Until there is meaningful movement towards electoral transparency, institutional independence, and genuine policy pluralism, Singapore’s elections will continue to produce outcomes that reflect control more than consent—and a brand of stability that feels increasingly indistinguishable from stagnation.
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