by Tan Tee Seng
The 2025 General Election in Singapore delivered a result that has left many politically engaged citizens disillusioned and searching for answers. For those who had hoped the opposition—particularly the Workers’ Party (WP), People Progress Party (PSP) and Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) —could build on the momentum of 2020, the outcome was a disappointment.
Despite fielding their strongest slate of candidates yet and contesting more seats than before, the WP was unable to prevent the People’s Action Party (PAP) from once again securing a dominant parliamentary majority, raising troubling questions about voter behaviour, political structure, and the health of Singapore’s democracy.
This year, the Workers’ Party contested six more seats than in 2020, and in these seats, they garnered an impressive 50.14% of the vote share—virtually identical to their 2020 performance.
However, this popular support only translated to 38.4% of the contested seats, down from 50% five years ago.
The discrepancy illustrates a deep institutional imbalance, caused primarily by the Group Representation Constituency (GRC) system. Under this structure, winning a constituency requires a party to sweep entire group slates—making it far harder for opposition candidates to translate meaningful vote shares into actual seats.
In effect, a system ostensibly designed for minority representation now functions as a powerful shield for incumbents.
One particularly frustrating result came from Jalan Kayu, where Ng Chee Meng—a candidate widely viewed as emblematic of the worst aspects of the PAP—narrowly won re-election.
His return to Parliament is, to many, a stark reminder of how entrenched party loyalty and fear-based voting can override dissatisfaction with individual performance. That someone like Ng, who struggled with public confidence, could still triumph, only deepens the sense of disconnect between public sentiment and parliamentary outcomes.
Even more baffling is the resounding success of ministers like Josephine Teo and Chan Chun Sing, both of whom secured more than 75% of the vote.
These results place them in the same range as widely respected statesmen like Tharman Shanmugaratnam and Lee Hsien Loong, which suggests that voters may no longer be making choices based on candidate quality.
The weight of the PAP brand and fear of instability continue to dominate electoral decision-making, even when the party fields uninspiring or controversial figures.
Crucially, the PAP’s campaign strategy this year avoided serious policy engagement. Instead, they leaned on four emotionally resonant but shallow messages: We are in uncertain times, and the PAP is a safe pair of hands; I need a strong mandate; These candidates are my team; I can’t do this without them.
Absent was any discussion of bold economic planning, housing affordability, or inclusive governance. The strategy was not about vision, but about control—imploring voters to choose autocracy masked as competence over the uncertainties of pluralism.
In effect, Singaporeans were not just asked to vote for the PAP, but to vote against democracy itself, with the underlying message being that true competition is dangerous and destabilizing. This is a sobering reflection of how fear continues to be a more powerful political force in Singapore than hope.
Another notable trend was the unprecedented number of spoilt votes, which surged from 45,000 in 2020 to over 95,000 in 2025.
This doubling suggests that a growing segment of voters were unwilling to support the PAP, yet also uninspired or confused by the presence of poorly organized minor opposition parties—derisively labeled as “mosquito” parties.
Some of these parties were so incoherent in platform and leadership that they may have done more harm than good, leading to speculation that they were strategically encouraged by pro-establishment actors to dilute the vote and create the illusion of broad PAP popularity.
Indeed, the headline swing toward the PAP is misleading, as it reflects not a genuine resurgence of support, but the failure and distortion caused by mosquito (larva!) parties many of whom bred by PAP. In constituencies where the Workers’ Party faced the PAP, such as Sengkang, Tampines, and Jalan Kayu, the races were tight.
WP made real inroads—nearly unseating Ng Chee Meng, coming close in Tampines, and retaining its core seats. These results show a party growing in discipline, depth, and credibility.
In contrast, the PAP is grappling with a manpower crisis, struggling to find compelling new candidates and relying increasingly on its brand and fear-based appeals to retain power. Unless serious internal reforms are undertaken—something that appears unlikely given the comfort of this year’s result—this imbalance between a stagnating ruling party and a strengthening opposition will only intensify.
Ultimately, this election underscores the conservative, risk-averse instincts that still dominate the Singaporean electorate. The “kiasu” mindset remains powerful—many Singaporeans continue to vote for the PAP not out of conviction, but out of a perceived lack of viable alternatives.
Yet underneath the disappointment, there is reason for cautious optimism. The electorate is growing more discerning, and the Workers’ Party is becoming more competitive in more places.
Singapore’s road to a healthier democracy may be longer than many hoped, but it is not closed. The trendlines—more than the headlines—suggest that change, though slow, is steadily brewing
This was first published on Tan See Seng’s Facebook post and reproduced with permission
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