When clemency is granted in a capital case in Singapore, it is expected to reflect a rare convergence of justice, mercy, and constitutional propriety.
In the recent case of Tristan Tan Yi Rui, however, clemency appears to have been exercised on grounds that fall outside the constitutional framework—granted not for recognised cooperation or judicially supported exceptional circumstances, but to address sentencing disparity stemming from prosecutorial discretion.
By contrast, Hamzah Ibrahim’s case—now nearing execution—falls more squarely within the scope of Article 22P(1)(a) of the Constitution. His cooperation with the Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) was formally acknowledged through a Certificate of Substantial Assistance (CSA), indicating that he provided valuable information to aid enforcement efforts. Yet his petition for clemency was rejected.
This contrast raises serious questions about how clemency powers are being exercised: whether the constitutional criteria are being applied consistently, and whether the legal basis for mercy is clearly grounded in law rather than unreviewable discretion.
A tale of two inmates, two legal frameworks
Article 22P(1)(a) of the Singapore Constitution explicitly provides that the President, acting on Cabinet’s advice, may “grant a pardon to any accomplice in any offence who gives information which leads to the conviction of the principal offender”.
While this clause refers to information that leads to a conviction, its broader intent is clear: to provide a constitutional mechanism for mercy where the State benefits from an accused’s cooperation in dismantling criminal operations.
Despite this, his death sentence was upheld on the technical ground that he was not legally classified as a “courier”—a separate requirement under the Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA) for sentencing discretion.
His eligibility for constitutional clemency under Article 22P(1)(a) was not meaningfully addressed.
On 29 November 2018, Hamzah, through his counsel, submitted a petition for clemency to the President. This petition was rejected on 5 July 2019, following consideration and advice from the Cabinet.
Tristan Tan: no CSA, no courier status, yet clemency granted
In contrast, Tristan Tan was found to have actively arranged a methamphetamine transaction, used aliases, and exchanged messages that clearly showed he was aware of his role. He was not issued a CSA and was determined by the court to have played a central role in the operation.
Yet on 14 August 2025, the Cabinet advised the President to commute his death sentence to life imprisonment.
The stated reason? A sentencing disparity between Tan and a co-accused who received a non-capital sentence due to prosecutorial decisions—not judicial findings.
In a media statement, the Ministry of Home Affairs said the Cabinet had been advised that Tan’s sentence was legally sound.
“Nevertheless, a recommendation was made to grant clemency to him because of the specific facts and circumstances of the case,” the ministry said.
Clemency of this kind is exceedingly rare—Tan’s case marks the first commutation of a death sentence in 27 years. Precisely because it is so exceptional, the decision demands a firm constitutional foundation.
Yet this rationale appears inconsistent with Article 22P. The Constitution does not empower the President to grant clemency to correct disparities arising from charging decisions. It permits pardons, reprieves, or commutations in defined circumstances—such as cooperation under 22P(1)(a), or where there are exceptional grounds supported by judicial reports.
An unclear and troubling use of constitutional power
The Cabinet’s explanation for granting clemency to Tristan Tan is constitutionally troubling. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, clemency was recommended “because of the specific facts and circumstances of the case,” particularly to address a sentencing disparity between Tan and a co-accused.
But this disparity arose not from judicial error, but from prosecutorial discretion—specifically, the Attorney-General’s decision to reduce charges for one accused while proceeding with a capital charge for another. Such charging decisions are not subject to judicial review and require no explanation. They operate outside the courts—and outside the Constitution’s framework for clemency.
While the Constitution permits the President, acting on Cabinet’s advice, to grant pardons, reprieves, or commutations under Article 22P, that power is not unbounded. Article 22P(1)(a) provides for clemency where an accomplice provides information leading to the conviction of a principal offender. Other forms of clemency may be granted in exceptional circumstances, but these are typically supported by judicial and legal reports, as outlined in Article 22P(2).
No such constitutional basis was cited in Tan’s case. The decision appears to rest entirely on a policy notion of fairness between co-accused—an area explicitly shaped by prosecutorial, not judicial, discretion.
This is especially troubling given that Hamzah Ibrahim, whose cooperation with law enforcement was formally recognised through a Certificate of Substantial Assistance, arguably meets the intent of Article 22P(1)(a). His petition for clemency was rejected, while Tan’s was accepted despite a lack of recognised constitutional grounds.
When clemency is used to retroactively “correct” charging outcomes shaped by opaque prosecutorial decisions—while overlooking constitutionally grounded cases like Hamzah’s—it risks becoming arbitrary and unmoored from legal principle.
The result is a clemency regime that appears inconsistent, opaque, and vulnerable to unequal application of mercy. That outcome sits uneasily within a system that claims to be governed by rule of law.
Justice cannot be discretionary grace
This is not a call for harsher treatment of those granted clemency. Rather, it is a call for the consistent application of constitutional principles—especially where capital punishment is involved.
Hamzah’s case exemplifies the scenario contemplated under Article 22P(1)(a): he cooperated meaningfully with enforcement, and this was formally recognised. His claim to clemency has a stronger constitutional basis than Tan’s.
That he now faces execution, while Tan does not, raises not only a moral question—but a constitutional one.
Constitutional clemency must follow constitutional rules
Singapore has long defended its capital punishment regime as firm but fair, citing robust legal safeguards and the rare possibility of executive mercy.
But clemency decisions must not erode that integrity by straying from the very legal framework that governs them.
The decision to grant clemency to Tristan Tan—without citing constitutional grounds—while denying it to Hamzah Ibrahim, who meets the requirements of Article 22P(1)(a), suggests an exercise of power untethered from law.
If constitutional mercy is to retain legitimacy, it must be exercised transparently, consistently, and in accordance with the provisions that confer it.
The post Why was clemency granted to Tristan Tan but not to Hamzah Ibrahim? appeared first on The Online Citizen.
